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Should government coerce individuals into wearing seatbelts
when they appear not to want to do so? Lawmakers in the 29 states
that have enacted mandatory seatbelt laws apparently believe so.
Moreover, federal regulations currently provide that automakers
must install automatic seatbelts or airbags by September, 1989.'
Opponents of these enactments have argued that "[p]ersons should
be allowed to engage in any activity that does not harm others, even
if it involves the risk of great harm to themselves, [and that a] per-
son's refusal to wear a seatbelt does not harm others and should not
be punished." 2 This Article argues that both perspectives are
flawed. Rather than relying upon a complete mandatory scheme or
complete laissez faire, government should use market incentives to
reduce the excessively high costs of auto accidents, 3 while enabling
consumers to make informed decisions about the nature of the pro-
tection they wish to use when riding in automobiles.
The rationale for such a policy is that economic efficiency will be
enhanced if, on the one hand, seatbelts are worn by those individu-
als for whom the benefits of reduced injuries outweigh the costs of
seatbelt use, and, on the other hand, seatbelts are not worn by those
for whom the costs exceed the benefits.4 Because the relative costs
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1. Occupant Crash Protection, 49 C.F.R. 571.208 S4.1.4 & S4.1.5 (1987). An auto-
matic seatbelt system engages the seatbelt without any action taken by the passenger.
These systems are either attached to the passenger door of the automobile or on a slid-
ing track above the passenger shoulder, and the belts slide into position when the pas-
senger enters the automobile.
2. Schwartz, The Seat Belt Defense and Mandatory Seat Belt Usage: Law, Ethics,
and Economics, 24 Idaho L. Rev. 275, 289 (1988).
3. In 1986, auto accidents resulted in 47,900 fatalities and 1.8 million disabling inju-
ries. National Safety Council, Accident Facts 45 (1987) [hereinafter Accident Facts]. At
birth, males have a risk of one in fifty that they will die in a motor vehicle crash, and
females have a risk of less than one in one hundred. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Fatal Accident Reporting System 1I, 23 (1986) [hereinafter Fatal Acci-
dent Reporting System].
4. A governmental action promotes economic efficiency in the Kaldor-Hicks sense if
the gains received by the winners are greater than the losses suffered by the losers. The
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and benefits from seatbelt use differ widely among consumers, a
mandatory seatbelt requirement will force some individuals to wear
seatbelts even though the costs to them outweigh the potential ben-
efits. 5 The laissez faire solution, although permitting the individual-
ized determinations that can promote efficient outcomes, is not
optimal because a number of factors generate a divergence between
the estimated private and social benefits of seatbelt use. As a result,
under laissez faire, many individuals fail to use seatbelts even
though an accurate assessment of the costs and benefits would
weigh in favor of seatbelt use. By more closely aligning the private
and social benefits of seatbelt use, the market-based regulatory
scheme proposed in this article should lead to more efficient alloca-
tion of resources as well as to reductions in deaths and injuries suf-
fered by auto occupants under a laissez faire approach.
Section I of this article discusses the efficiency of laissez faire by
examining the factors which contribute to the divergence between
estimations of private and social benefits of seatbelt use, and con-
cludes that individual choices made under a laissez faire regime are
not optimal owing to these factors. Section II evaluates the possible
bases for government intervention and provides a brief overview of
the development of occupant restraint legislation at both the federal
and state levels. It concludes that coercive measures-mandating
seatbelt use or other occupant restraints-are also not optimal be-
cause they emphasize the benefits but not the attendant costs of
these measures. Section III closely examines the costs and benefits
of seatbelt use and develops a framework of analysis for a proposed
market-based regulatory scheme. Section IV sets forth the details of
the market-based scheme to encourage seatbelt use and examines
the problems of implementation and the likely consequences of this
approach to regulation.
concept is susceptible to a number of normative criticisms when used as the sole crite-
rion for policy assessment, but it is nonetheless an important tool for analysis. See Dono-
hue, The Law and Economics of Tort Law: The Profound Revolution, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
1047 (1989) (reviewing W. Landes & R. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law
(1987), and S. Shavell, Economic Analyses of Accident Law (1987)); Donohue, Law and
Economics: The Road Not Taken, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 903 (1988); Donohue & Ayres,
Posner's Symphony No. 3: Thinking About the Unthinkable, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 791 (1987)
(reviewing R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, (3d ed. 1986)).
5. For example, the National Research Council has estimated that requiring seatbelts
to be installed in school buses would cost $40 million but would save only one life per
year in transporting 25 million children to school. The Council therefore advised Con-
gress not to mandate such a seatbelt requirement. Johnson, Study Rejects Requiring




I. The Inefficiencies of Laissez Faire
Many states do not have regulations requiring car occupants to
wear seatbelts or other types of protective restraints. Under such
laissez-faire regimes, individual occupants are free to choose
whether they wish to trade the comfort and time saved from not
wearing a seatbelt for the enhanced safety from wearing a seatbelt.
However, this freedom to choose does not necessarily result in the
efficient use of seatbelts because individual choices are often not so-
cially optimal. The failure to achieve optimal choice reflects the dis-
crepancy between the perceived private benefit and actual social
benefit of seatbelt use.6 Since individuals generally have little prob-
lem making an accurate calculus of the costs of wearing a seatbelt,
the problem is largely one of accurately evaluating the potential
benefits of seatbelt use. The following discusses four reasons why
an individual might not accurately evaluate such benefits under lais-
sez faire.
A. Inadequate Information
Auto passengers may lack the information to adequately assess
the benefits of wearing occupant restraints. As George Stigler has
noted in the context of financial markets, "information costs are the
costs of transportation from ignorance to omniscience, and seldom
can a trader afford to take the entire trip." 7 The same is true in the
"market" where decisions to wear or not to wear seatbelts are made.
If consumers believe that the benefits of wearing seatbelts are less
than the social value of such benefits, they may fail to wear belts
even though it objectively would be in their interest to do so. Given
the widely varying estimates of the benefits of seatbelt use," it is
hardly surprising that consumers would not have a very precise idea
of the magnitude of these benefits.
If inadequate information is the problem, the government may be
able to achieve the social optimum by providing accurate informa-
tion on the probabilities and magnitude of harm from auto acci-
dents and the ability of seatbelts to reduce that harm. Consumers
could then weigh the expected benefits of wearing belts with the
associated costs. Unfortunately, it is not easy to reach all consumers
6. The total benefit (private and social) of seatbelt use is conceived of as the value of
total accident cost reductions attributable to the use of seatbelts.
7. G. Stigler, Imperfections in the Capital Market, in The Organization of Industry
113, 119 (1968).
8. See infa text accompanying notes 74-79 and Table 3.
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even with such easily conveyed information. Thus, mere publica-
tion, even in a vastly simplified form, might not achieve the goal of
adequately informing consumers."
B. The Problem of Moral Hazard
Even if consumers recognize the true social costs and benefits of
seatbelt use, they might not act optimally. Since consumers are re-
imbursed for much of the costs associated with auto injuries, the
private benefit from wearing belts may well be substantially below
the social benefit.' 0 For example, private and governmental insur-
ance plans pay a vast portion of the medical expenses resulting from
auto accidents.'' In addition, employers and the government will
bear much of the burden from lost work output while accident vic-
tims are recovering from their injuries. ' 2 Moreover, employers pay a
significant share of the costs of auto accidents, since 25% of all
auto-related deaths and nearly half of the disabling injuries involve
employees at work.' 3 Thus, even with the proper information, con-
sumers may have an incentive to underuse seatbelts since they will
not reap all of the benefits from wearing seatbelts but will bear all of
the attendant costs.'
4
9. In addition, there is considerable variation in auto-related fatality rates within the
United States. For example, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Massachusetts all had death
rates (on a per 100 million vehicle mile basis) of 1.8 in 1986, while Arizona led the
nation with a rate of 4.5. Accident Facts, supra note 3, at 70-71. Thus, the benefits of
seatbelt use will vary significantly across states, increasing the complexity of fully in-
forming all auto occupants.
10. Note that, unless insurers can monitor the seatbelt-wearing behavior of auto oc-
cupants, insured individuals will not take an adequate level of care, or, in other words,
will not wear seatbelts at the optimal level. S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident
Law 258 (1987).
11. As New York Governor Mario Cuomo stated, in support of New York's
mandatory seatbelt law, "whether it's through risk-pooling accident insurance or
through tax support of some forms of health care, we're all paying the medical bills for
those who injure themselves needlessly by failing to wear seatbelts." Highway Users
Federation, Discussion Paper on Occupant Protection: How Thousands of Lives Can Be
Saved, App. A (1985).
12. Many workers receive their full compensation during periods of illness or injury.
In certain jobs, however, injured employees simply are not compensated during periods
in which they cannot work. These injured workers will fully, bear the burden of their lost
income absent coverage by some governmental income maintenance scheme.
13. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, The Economic Costs of Safety
Belt Nonuse I (1986).
14. The divergence between private and social benefits from wearing seatbelts could
be eliminated if insurance companies could distinguish those who wear belts from those
who do not. The insurance company could then deny some portion of benefits to those
who are not wearing belts in a crash. Unfortunately, because of the difficulty of ascer-
taining whether a seatbelt has been used, "insurance companies currently [do not] pro-
vide incentives in the form of premium reductions based solely on regular belt usage
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Perhaps it is the realization that the public bears a large burden
from seatbelt non-usage that can explain what would otherwise be
some puzzling public opinion data. A national study conducted by
Nordhaus Research Inc. in 1985 found that 68% of adults in the
U.S. favored mandatory seatbelt laws and that 86% believed that a
significant number of lives would be saved if all auto occupants wore
belts. Nonetheless, national seatbelt usage rates in December 1985
were only 23%. These findings may reflect the public's realization
that the failure to wear seatbelts is socially harmful but privately ra-
tional due to the existence of third party payments.
C. Underestimating the Probability of an Accident
I There is evidence that at least some individuals systematically un-
derestimate the probability of occurrence of low probability
events.' 5 These individuals may act on the assumption that, since
the probability of having an accident on their next auto outing is
very small, it can be treated as zero. For example, consider whether
you are more likely to buckle your seatbelt if you know that the
probability of having a fatal accident on your next trip is .00000025, or
that the probability of having a fatal accident at some point in a 50
year driving career is one in a hundred. One experiment by Slovic,
Fischoff, and Lichtenstein suggested that individuals were more
likely to wear belts if they were apprised of the "one in a hundred
risk," even though under typical assumptions these two probabili-
ties are the same. 'l Moreover, in surveys, individuals vastly underes-
timate their probability of being involved in auto accidents.17
.... National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Assessment of Insurance Incen-
tives for Safety Belt use, at x (1983). In the event of a fatality, it is more readily con-
firmed whether an individual was wearing a belt, which explains how General Motors
can provide a $10,000 payment to any passenger in a new GM car who is killed while
wearing a seatbelt in the first year of ownership. In some states, GM's insurance affiliate
offers coverage for succeeding years as well. The cost of such coverage for the first
additional year is $6.25, and $9.75 and $13.25 for the subsequent two years. General
Motors Corporation Press Release, Update on GM $10,000 Life Belt User Insurance
Program (Mar. 6, 1987).
15. Tversky & Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 Cognitive Psychology 207 (1973).
16. See Arnould & Grabowski, Auto Safety Regulation: An Analysis of Market Fail-
ure, 12 BellJ. Econ. 27, 35. The two probabilities are the same under the assumption
that the average individual takes 800 rides per year. Thus, over a 50 year driving career,
one will take 50 * 800 = 40,000 rides. Therefore, the probability that one will not be in
a fatal crash in 40,000 rides equals (I - .00000025) raised to the 40,000 power, or .99.
The probability that one will be in a fatal crash is then 1 -- .99 = .01.
17. In one survey, individuals were asked to assess the probability of being involved
in an automobile accident of any kind in the next year. The true probability was roughly
10 out of 100. A majority of the respondents selected odds of I out of 100 or greater.
Id. at 34. The explanation of these results may be that individuals have a distorted view
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However, that individuals seem to underassess the probability of
auto accidents does not necessarily support the case for mandatory
seatbelt laws. In fact, the experimental results may suggest that
government should simply package the information into a form,
such as the "one in a hundred" statistic, that consumers can under-
stand better and thereby respond to more appropriately. Still, as
noted above, the costs of conveying even simple information to con-
sumers can be quite high.
D. Cognitive Dissonance
Even apart from the difficulty that individuals have in evaluating
small probabilities, they may also tend to systematically understate
the risk of certain harms. This is because certain individuals simply
ignore, through the process of cognitive dissonance, the heightened
risk of being involved in an auto accident without a seatbelt. The
theory of cognitive dissonance has been examined in many contexts
to explain the economically irrational behavior of individuals. As
economist George Akerlof suggests:
Cognitive dissonance theory would suggest that persons in dangerous
jobs must decide between two conflicting cognitions. According to
one cognition, ego is a smart person who would not choose to work in
an unsafe place. If the worker continues to work in the dangerous job,
he will try to reject the cognition that the job is dangerous.' 8
Similarly, individuals may pay a psychological price if they con-
template the possibility of being injured in an automobile acci-
dent."'  A voluntary decision to buckle a seatbelt requires one to
acknowledge the possibility of an accident, thereby imposing the
psychological cost. As a result, consumers may rationally decide to
ignore certain dangers if the psychological cost of considering them
is too high. Conceivably, if car users buckle the seatbelt out of def-
erence to coercive or incentive-based governmental regulation, they
may avoid the psychological cost. In this case, the individual tells
himself that he is taking the precaution not because danger is pres-
ent but because the government has forced him to do so.
of their own driving skills. One study found that 88% of Americans believe themselves
to be safer drivers than the median driver. Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More
Skillful Than Fellow Drivers?, Acta Psychologica 143, 146 (1981).
18. Akerlof, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 Am. Econ.
Rev. 307, 309 (1982).
19. Unwillingness to consider unattractive events may explain why many individuals




II. The Ineficiencies of Mandatory Government Regulation
The rationale for government regulation has focused on only one
side of the cost-benefit equation-i.e., the benefits resulting from
seatbelt use. Very little attention has been given to the costs associ-
ated with requiring mandatory seatbelt use. In other words, both
federal and state legislators in enacting occupant restraint laws have
assumed that a decrease of fatality and other accident costs is in it-
self a sufficient justification for coercive regulation. This section ex-
amines the claim that seatbelts save lives, provides an overview of
the development of federal and state occupant restraint legislation
and regulation, and presents a critique of the rationale which under-
lies mandatory seatbelt laws and passive restraints.
A. The Rationale for Government Action: Seatbelts Save Lives
It is generally accepted that increased use of seatbelts by automo-
bile occupants will save lives and reduce injuries. For example, in
considering a challenge to the Reagan Administration's initial at-
tempt to eliminate the mandatory passive restraint standard,2 0 the
Supreme Court stated: "We start with the accepted ground that if
used, seatbelts unquestionably would save many thousands of lives
and would prevent tens of thousands of crippling injuries." 2' A
large and growing body of literature supports this proposition. 22
1. The Peltzman Theory. Nonetheless, University of Chicago
economist Sam Peltzman has expressed concern that governmental
efforts to increase seatbelt use may generate some adverse conse-
quences. In an interesting early paper, Peltzman cautioned that ef-
forts to protect drivers may actually increase deaths and injuries.
23
Peltzman argued that, if safety regulation succeeded in decreasing
20. See infra text accompanying notes 41-44.
21. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 US. 29, 52
(1983).
22. See, e.g., Turnball, Dunne, Barrett, Langenberg & Orsay, Prospective Study of the
Effect of Safety Belts on Morbidity and Health Care Costs in Motor Vehicle Accidents,
260 J.A.M.A. 3598 (1988); Chorba, Reinfurt & Hulka, Efficacy of Mandatory Seat Belt
Use Legislation, 260 J.A.M.A. 3593 (1988); University of North Carolina Highway Safety
Research Center, 1985-1986 Experience with Belt Laws in the United States (1987)
[hereinafter UNC Highway Safety Research Center]; Accident Facts, supra note 3 (citing
a study by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety); Arnould & Grabowski, supra note
16; Lave & Weber, A Benefit-Cost Analysis of Auto Safety Features, 2 Applied Econ. 265
(1970).
23. Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 677
(1975) (cited with apparent approval in R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 351 n.2
(3d ed. 1986). See also Peltzman, The Regulation of Automobile Safety, in Auto Safety
Regulation: The Cure or The Problem? I (H. Manne & R. Miller ed. 1976).
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the risk of death from an accident, then drivers might alter their
behavior by driving faster or more recklessly, since the "cost" of an
accident had been reduced. As a result, total injuries from auto ac-
cidents would rise since (1) more frequent and perhaps more seri-
ous accidents would occur, and (2) unprotected pedestrians might
suffer greater injuries. In Peltzman's terms: "The mandatory instal-
lation of safety devices does not by itself change the private demand
for safety, but it may change some relevant prices the response to
which may mitigate some of the technological promise of these de-
vices." 24 However, as my former colleague Mark Steitz has noted in
jest, if we follow Peltzman's logic, then the way to reduce injuries
from auto accidents is to place a dagger in the steering column
aimed at the driver's heart.
Figure 1 illustrates Peltzman's theory with a simple example that
assumes that only two factors-vehicle speed and seatbelt use-in-
fluence the expected accident costs from driving an automobile.2
5
In general, driving at higher speeds generates benefits-by saving
time and perhaps by generating a feeling of exhilaration-at the
cost of an increased number and severity of automobile accidents.
Curve C, represents the increasing marginal expected accident
losses resulting from driving at faster speeds without seatbelts.2 1t
Curve B represents the marginal benefits associated with driving at
faster speeds. 27 The intersection of the two curves at E, defines the
equilibrium when seatbelts are not worn: drivers will drive at, say,
55 mph and the dollar value of the expected accident losses is given
by the sum of areas I and II.
24. Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, supra note 23, at 680-8 1.
25. As noted above, Peltzman argued that anything that makes drivers feel safer may
induce them not only to drive faster, but to drive more recklessly as well. Figure 1
restricts the analysis to the response of increased speed only to illustrate how enhanced
driver safety may theoretically be offset by an accompanying increase in the dangers
brought about by increased speed.
26. The expected accident losses from driving include all damage of any kind-
whether to pedestrians, auto occupants, or property-that the driver will be responsible
for paying or will personally suffer. C lies below C, because the use of seatbelts will
lower the expected damage to auto occupants, even though other types of damage
would presumably remain unchanged. Thus, the distance between C, and C at any
given speed represents only the reduction in expected accident costs to auto occupants
purely due to the use of seatbelts.
27. The marginal benefits of driving faster are depicted as declining, although the
analysis would have proceeded similarly if I had instead assumed that the marginal bene-
fits were constant. An example may justify the assumption of declining marginal bene-
fits. If Bill drives 5 mph faster all week long he may be able to save enough time to allow
him to watch his favorite TV sitcom. If Bill drives 10 mph faster he will then be able to
also watch his second most favorite TV sitcom, which presumably gives him less plea-










As Peltzman's work implies, the enforced seatbelt use require-
ment lowers the expected accident cost curve, since, at any given
speed at which an accident occurs, total damage will be reduced, on
average, by the reduction in damage to the belted vehicle occupants.
Thus, the expected loss curve shifts down from C1 to C 2 .28 The re-
sulting equilibrium is then given by E,,. As a result of the seatbelt
requirement, drivers are willing to increase their vehicle speed to,
perhaps, 70 mph, and the total expected accident loss will be repre-
sented by areas II and III. Thus, this simple illustration depicts
Peltzman's prediction that, if drivers are protected by safety regula-
tion, they may change their behavior and become more reckless-by
driving faster, in this example. At the same time, the consequences
for total accident costs are ambiguous: if area I is less than area III,
then the safety regulation will actually have increased total accident
losses.
2. A critical view of the Peltzman Theory. Peltzman's theory,
however, founders on the empirical evidence. As Peltzman himself
28. Both curves have the same y-intercept of zero because there will be no accident
losses if the automobile is not driven (i.e., is driven at speed zero).
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reports, the advent of safety regulation did not lead to increased ve-
hicle speeds.2 9 In fact, since drivers are constrained by other regu-
lation (e.g., speed limits), they may not be able to increase their
speeds at all in response to changes in safety regulation, even if they
are inclined to do so. Suppose, for example, that drivers want to
respond to the mandatory seatbelt requirement by driving faster,
but that they are prevented from doing so by the 55 mph speed
limit. Mandating seatbelt use would then shift the expected acci-
dent loss curve from C, to C, and, because of the speed limit, would
lead to equilibrium E3.3° In this case, the shift to wearing seatbelts
unambiguously has caused total accident losses to decline, since the
sum of areas I and II necessarily exceeds area II alone.
Of course, it is possible that the Peltzman effect would increase
the desire of drivers both to speed and to drive recklessly, and that
differences in the ability of the police to enforce the laws prohibiting
such behavior would lead to no increase in speeding but significant
increases in reckless driving. Yet, even granting the perhaps ques-
tionable premise that it is easier to enforce prohibitions on speeding
than those on reckless driving,3' the evidence suggests that the
safety benefits of seatbelts dwarf any offsetting tendency to drive
less carefully.3 2 Thus, when properly construed in light of the em-
pirical evidence, Peltzman's work does not undermine the view that
seatbelts save lives.
3 3
29. After examining the effect of increased safety regulation on vehicle speed,
Peltzman concludes, "[W]e must reject the hypothesis of a regulation-induced increase
in vehicle speed." Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, supra note
23, at 703.
30. Drivers would like to increase their vehicle speed past 55 mph (because at that
level the benefits of increased speed, given by curve B, exceed the costs, given by curve
C,,), but they are prohibited from so doing. Thus, they will drive at 55 mph and suffer
accidents costs of area II.
31. Remember that both these prohibitions are subject to direct regulation by law
enforcement officials, as well as to indirect regulation through the tort system of unrea-
sonable behavior that leads to injury.
32. See Crandall & Graham, Automobile Safety Regulation and Offsetting Behavior:
Some New Empirical Estimates, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 328, 330 (1984) ("[T]he intrinsic
engineering effects of safety devices appear to swamp the behavior responses. That re-
sult differs substantially from Peltzman's original empirical result.").
33. Peltzman also suggests that his prediction of increased risk-taking is supported
by the post-1965 increase in the propensity of young people to drive and the growth in
drunk driving, but the leap from these findings to the conclusion that they are caused by
auto safety regulation is quite heroic. Even Peltzman concedes that the "annual growth
of alcohol consumption has roughly doubled since 1965, so it risks exaggeration to attri-
bute all of the reported increases in drunk driving to legal changes." Peltzman, The
Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, supra note 23, at 705. As Richard Nelson has
stated:
If one did not go into the study with Peltzman's particular blinders, and saw the
data that Peltzman has uncovered, the analyst might have asked, in a quite open-
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Figure 1 can also be used to show that, while seatbelts may save
lives, their enforced use can generate inefficiencies. 34 For example,
the move from laissez faire to a mandatory seatbelt requirement will
impose the cost of installing and using seatbelts while generating an
increase in social welfare given by the area 0EIE2 without a speed
limit and 0EIE 3 with a speed limit. If we assume that both these
areas are greater than the cost and use of seatbelts, then the seatbelt
regulation is efficient. Even in this case, however, the use of the
speed limit imposes the deadweight loss E3EE,,. This establishes
the general point that regulations (or combinations of regulations)
that save lives are not necessarily efficient: total accident losses are
reduced by imposing mandatory seatbelt laws and speed limits, but
social welfare would be unambiguously greater without the speed
limit.
B. Developments in Auto Safety Regulations
Recognizing that occupant restraint devices save lives, legislators
and government regulators sought to increase their use through
various laws and regulations. The thirty year trend toward greater
use of seatbelts began fitfully in 1956 when Ford Motor Company,
the first manufacturer to offer seatbelts to consumers, quickly termi-
nated the option, allegedly because of unsatisfactory purchase
rates.3 5 Five years later, New York State passed legislation mandat-
ing the installation of seatbelts in automobiles sold in New York.
The federal government subsequently followed New York's lead by
minded way: Why the rise in teenage driving and drunk driving (which seems plau-
sibly connected with rising pedestrian fatalities and property damage)? In search-
ing for the factors behind these developments, the researcher might have looked at
a number of variables, but I doubt seriously whether he would have put very much
weight on the possibility that the main reason was the new auto safety legislation.
Without the legislation, would the incidence of young driving and drunk driving
have been significantly less? Would it be an effective attack on rising pedestrian
deaths and property damage to actually ban seat belts and related auto safety
devices?
Nelson, Comments on Peltzman's Paper on Automobile Safety Regulation, in Auto
Safety Regulation: The Cure or The Problem? 63, 65 (H. Manne & R. Miller ed. 1976).
See also id. at 89-96 for an illuminating exchange between Peltzman and Nelson.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 67-71 for a general discussion of the inefficien-
cies of mandatory seatbelt laws.
35. Lee Iacocca has stated that the primary reason for the removal of seatbelts was
the images of injury and fatality generated by their presence. According to Iacocca,
automobile industry executives were concerned about the negative effects these images
would have on their ability to market their products. L. Iacocca, Iacocca 296 (1984).
This phenomenon can provide a justification for mandatory seatbelt installation, since a
manufacturer's act of voluntarily offering seatbelts would make its cars appear more
dangerous. See T. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior, 213, 223-24 (1978) (ar-
guing that all hockey players would like to wear helmets but they refuse to do so absent
coercion for fear of being viewed as cowardly).
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passing the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,
which created the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA).3"' In 1967, NHTSA issued Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) 208, which required the installation of seatbelts
in all automobiles. 37 Nevertheless, while federal actions guaranteed
those driving in new cars the availability of seatbelts, more than
85% of the population declined to wear them. 38 Consequently, fed-
eral regulators began to think in terms of "passive restraints," such
as airbags or automatic seatbelts that would automatically protect
vehicle occupants.
1. The interlock system. In 1972, FMVSS 208 was amended to
require full passive protection for all front seat occupants on new
cars beginning in August of 1975. For the period between August
1973 and August 1975, manufacturers were ordered to supply
either passive restraints or lap and shoulder belts coupled with an
"ignition interlock" that would prevent the car from being started
until front seat passengers had buckled their seatbelts. Confronted
with this choice, the automakers chose the ill-fated interlock option.
Consumer response to the interlock system was extraordinarily neg-
ative, and Congress quickly reacted to the public outcry by eliminat-
ing this requirement. 3
For those regulators seeking to maximize seatbelt use, the inter-
lock system was the perfect solution: car occupants had to fasten
their belts just to start their cars. The interlock system clearly in-
creased belt use in new cars and reduced the enforcement costs that
would attend any mandatory seatbelt usage law. However, it also
created numerous inefficiencies: (1) the system could be discon-
nected, which meant that the expense of the system was completely
wasted; (2) since the system was triggered by sensors that perceive
weight on the front seat, it required car owners to buckle up even
when there was no benefit from doing so, such as when starting the
car to perform an engine repair or when transporting a bag of gro-
ceries on the passenger seat; and (3) it gave no consideration to the
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982).
37. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, 49 CFR § 571.208 (1987).
38. Seatbelt use by drivers did not reach 15% until late in 1984. National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, The Estimation of Economic Savings From Increased
Safety Belt Use 2 (1985) [hereinafter Estimation of Economic Savings].
39. The interlock system was eliminated by the Motor Vehicle and School Bus Safety
Amendments of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1410b(b) (1982). The Amendments prohibited any
motor vehicle safety standard that required either an interlock system or a continuous




interests of those for whom the costs of seatbelt use clearly out-
weighed the benefits.
2. The battle over passive restraints. The chaotic development of
federal safety regulation continued when the Ford Administration
delayed the August 1975 deadline for mandatory passive restraint
systems for one year, and then suspended it entirely in December
1976.40 A few months later, the Carter Administration reintroduced
a plan that would have required front-seat passive protection over a
three-year period beginning in model year 1982.4 1 Yet, another
switch in administrations again altered the fate of the mandatory
passive restraint standard. In the wake of intense lobbying efforts
by the insurance industry in support of mandatory passive restraints
and by the auto manufacturers in opposition, the Reagan Adminis-
tration responded by ordering a one year delay of, and eventually
rescinding, the Carter plan.
42
However, the auto industry's success in the executive branch was
soon reversed by the insurance industry's success before the judici-
ary. The Supreme Court in Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Association v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. held that NHTSA's rescis-
sion of the passive restraint standard was defective in that the
agency "failed to supply the requisiter reasoned analysis' " for its
decision. 43 Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurring opinion:
"since the airbag and continuous spool automatic seatbelt were ex-
plicitly approved in the Standard the agency was rescinding, the
agency should explain why it declined to leave those requirements
intact. In this case, the agency gave no explanation at all."
'44
In response to the Supreme Court's direction to consider the is-
sue further, NHTSA developed a new approach to protect front seat
passengers. This new scheme was based on two findings: (1) of all
the available options, the strict enforcement by states of mandatory
seatbelt usage laws would most quickly and inexpensively provide
the greatest safety benefits; and (2) the next best option was to re-
quire automakers to provide passive restraints, such as automatic
seatbelts or airbags. 45 To implement these findings, NHTSA an-
nounced an amended FMVSS 208 requiring the gradual phase-in of
automatic restraints, culminating in the installation of automatic re-
straints in all new cars beginning with model year 1990 (September
40. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. 29, 36-37 (1983).
41. Modified Standard 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1978).
42. See 463 U.S. 29, 38.
43. 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983).
44. Id. at 57-8.
45. Occupant Crash Protection, 49 Fed. Reg. 28962 (1984).
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1, 1989), unless prior to that time the state mandatory belt usage
laws that have been enacted cover at least two-thirds of the U.S.
population.4
6
C. State Mandatory Seatbelt Laws
1. Responding to NHTSA's encouragement. A few months after
this rule was promulgated, New York became the first state to accept
NHTSA's invitation to enact a mandatory seatbelt law. At present, a
total of 29 states and the District of Columbia have mandatory
seatbelt laws.4 7 In order to identify factors influencing the decision
to enact a seatbelt law, I estimated a logit model using the following
explanatory variables:48 per capita income of the state, education
level, population density, and region dummies. My working hypoth-
esis was that the greater the percentage of residents for whom the
social (not necessarily private) benefits of seatbelt use exceeded its
costs, the greater the likelihood that the state would adopt a
mandatory seatbelt law. Somewhat surprisingly, the only two vari-
ables that were consistently statistically significant were per capita
income and the Northeast dummy.49
The first major finding that emerged from the statistical evidence
was that states with higher per capita income were more likely to
enact mandatory seatbelt laws. 5° While the predicted sign on this
variable was unclear a priori-because the higher one's income, the
higher are both the costs and benefits of using seatbelts-the empir-
ical evidence may suggest that the benefits of wearing seatbelts rise
more quickly than the costs as income increases. Alternatively, since
income and education levels are highly correlated, it is possible that
higher education levels contribute to the enactment of state seatbelt
46. Id.
47. UNC Highway Safety Research Center, supra note 22, at 1. Two states-Massa-
chusetts and Nebraska-adopted mandatory seatbelt laws and then rescinded them
through voter referenda in 1986. Id.
48. A logit model is a standard econometric tool for analyzing binary choice deci-
sions. See R. Pindyck & D. Rubinfeld, Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts 274-
80 (2d ed. 1981).
49. The most parsimonious model explaining whether or not a state had a
mandatory seatbelt law (yes= 1, no=0 will therefore include only these two variables.
The results of this logit regression were as follows:
log(p/i-p) = -5.9 + [.00049 * Income] + [-2.8 * NE],
(2.4) (2.5) (2.7)
where p represents the probability of enacting a seatbelt law, Income represents the
particular state's per capita income, and NE identifies Northeastern states. The num-
bers in parentheses are t-statistics, and all the coefficients are significant at the .05 level.




laws.5 ' The second major finding was that states in the Northeast
were considerably less likely to have seatbelt laws than one would
have expected given their relatively high per capita income levels.
52
While this finding is somewhat surprising,5 3 a possible explanation
is that many of the northeastern states have quite low death rates
per vehicle mile, which may result in a lesser perceived need for
seatbelt legislation.
54
The effects of the two significant variables are quantified and
presented in Table 1, which shows the probability that a state will
adopt a mandatory seatbelt usage law for different levels of per cap-
ita income and region. Note that the probability that a non-north-
eastern state will adopt a mandatory seatbelt law is almost 90% if its
per capita income is one standard deviation above the mean level
for all states, but only 45% if its income is one standard deviation
below the mean. Conversely, northeastern states with these same
income levels have sharply lower probabilities of adopting seatbelt
laws .5
5
2. Thwarting NHTSA's instructions. While NHTSA has been
surprisingly successful in achieving its goal of encouraging states to
adopt mandatory seatbelt laws, it has been less successful in its ef-
forts to dictate what these laws should provide beyond the general
requirement that front seat occupants have their seatbelts fastened
when their vehicle is in forward motion. 5 5 NHTSA declared that
51. More educated citizens might be able to perceive more accurately that the social
benefits of seatbelt use outweigh its costs and therefore not only choose to use seatbelts
themselves, but support mandatory seatbelt laws to prevent others from generating the
external costs of not wearing belts.
52. Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey were the three northeastern states that
have seatbelt laws. Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and
Rhode Island do not have such laws.
53. Could it be the product of "Yankee individualism," which at times exalts free-
dom over life itself? For example, the famous slogan adorning New Hampshire license
plates-"Live Free or Die"-would seem to embody a sentiment inconsistent with
mandatory seatbelt laws.
54. See Accident Facts, supra note 3, at 70.
55. Since Massachusetts is an affluent northeastern state that first had a mandatory
law and then rescinded it, I also decided to eliminate it from the analysis to see if the
results presented above were sensitive to its inclusion as a state without a mandatory
law. The logit results were quite similar to those presented above.
56. It is interesting to speculate why so many states responded to NHTSA's effort to
encourage the adoption of mandatory seatbelt laws by offering the incentives of avoid-
ing a mandatory passive restraint standard. During the Carter Administration, NHTSA
offered to provide federal grant funds to states that passed mandatory seatbelt laws and
only Puerto Rico enacted such a law at that time. See Arnould & Grabowski, supra note
16, at 28. In other words, the states did not respond to NHTSA's appeals when they
would have received cash payments for doing so, but did respond when the sanction for
refusing to adopt such laws fell most directly on the automakers, who would then be
forced to comply with the mandatory passive restraint standard. This may suggest that
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TABLE 1
Probability of Adopting a Mandatory Seatbelt Usage Law




Note: The mean per capita income level for all states was $13,956, and the other two
income figures are one standard deviation above and below this mean.
state mandatory seatbelt laws would only be counted towards its
two-thirds requirement if they met certain standards.5 7 One of
these standards was that the fine for violating the mandatory belt
law must be at least $25, which is above the level currently specified
in about half the states. 58  A second requirement of meeting the
two-thirds rule was that the law must provide that non-use of a
seatbelt will reduce the damages awarded to injured plaintiffs in civil
lawsuits. Very few states have adopted such provisions. 511
Moreover, some states that adopted mandatory usage laws also
desired the adoption of the federal mandatory passive restraint stan-
dard. As a result, there emerged an interesting strategic response to
NHTSA's plan to rescind the federal requirement of automatic re-
straints if enough states enacted mandatory belt laws: a number of
states specified that their seatbelt laws would become void if
NHTSA uses them in calculating whether or not to rescind the
FMVSS 208 automatic restraint requirementlio
major auto manufacturers have greater influence on state legislatures than the federal
government does. Apparently, when General Motors was considering where to locate
its massive Saturn manufacturing plant, it courted states such as Illinois and Tennessee
that did not have mandatory usage laws and indicated that passage of such laws would
be factors in favor of a decision to locate in that state. Both states quickly adopted such
laws during the courtship, and the Saturn plant ended up in Spring Hill, Tennessee.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1987, at D4.
57. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 $4.1.5.2(c)(2) (1987).
58. Minnesota is the only state with a mandatory seatbelt law that does not levy a fine
but only warns violators. Violators of the seatbelt laws in other states face fines ranging
from $5 in Idaho to a maximum of $50 in New York, California, and New Mexico.
59. For example, the Louisiana statute provides that non-use of a seatbelt is admissi-
ble in a civil lawsuit, but limits the maximum reduction in damages to 2%. Other states
have adopted this basic approach, although they vary on the permissible percentage re-
duction in damages: Michigan (5%), Missouri (1%), and Nebraska (5%). New Jersey
and New York permit the evidence of non-use in civil actions but do not specify a maxi-
mum percentage reduction in damage awards. National Safety Council, Mandatory
Safety Belt Use Laws By State in the United States 2-3 (1987). However, a number of
the mandatory seatbelt usage laws specifically prohibit the use of evidence of a violation
of the seatbelt statute to mitigate damages. See generally Schwartz, supra note 2 (advocat-
ing that noncompliance should be a basis for mitigating damages).
60. California, North Carolina, Missouri, Maryland, and the District of Columbia
have adopted such provisions. It is possible that the combined efforts of NHTSA and
464
Using Market Incentives
Thus, even though almost three-quarters of the nation's popula-
tion is now covered by state seatbelt laws, 6' the mandatory
airbag/passive restraint standard scheduled to go into effect on Sep-
tember 1, 1989 will not be obviated by the passage of state seatbelt
laws. Nonetheless, NHTSA's innovative effort to increase seatbelt
use beyond the previous level of 15% has been successful: national
usage rates rose to 23% in December 1985 and to 34% by June
1986. 612 Table 2 presents the usage rates before and after the listed
states adopted mandatory seatbelt laws. The latest average usage
rate observed in those states with current seatbelt laws is 48%.63
D. A Final Wrinkle on the Passive Restraint Standard
Meanwhile, the tortuous path of federal safety regulation contin-
ues. In 1987, NHTSA again amended FMVSS 208 to allow auto
manufacturers to wait until 1993 to install airbags or other auto-
matic restraints to protect all front seat occupants if they put airbags
on the driver's side by 1989.64 Although this new extension weak-
ens the automatic protection to be afforded to the front seat passen-
ger, it does encourage the introduction of airbags to protect drivers,
who are involved in almost three-fourths of all front seat fatalities." 5
E. The Problems with Mandatory Seatbelt Laws and Passive Restraints
As the above discussion shows, tension between the mandatory
requirement and purely laissez faire interests contributed to abrupt
reversals and repeated delays in various regulatory decisions. But
one thing is clear: because of information costs, the moral hazard
problems arising from third party reimbursements, difficulties in
evaluating low probability risks, and cognitive dissonance, a laissez
the automakers were enough to put mandatory seatbelt laws on the legislative agenda in
many states, but were not sufficient to ensure that the seatbelt laws ultimately enacted
would further the automakers' goal of avoiding a mandatory passive restraint standard.
61. General Motors Corporation Press Release, supra note 14.
62. Accident Facts, supra note 3, at 53. The usage rate equals the percentage of
passenger car occupants that wear seatbelts. Somewhat surprisingly, the number of traf-
fic deaths per 100 million vehicle miles remained at 2.57 for both 1985 and 1986, de-
spite the increased seatbelt use. Perhaps this increase did not occur in the group that
would benefit most-young male drivers. Id. at 45. Nonetheless, this fatality rate is the
lowest to date, and is roughly half the rate experienced twenty years earlier. See id. at 64.
63. UNC Highway Safety Research Center, supra note 22, at 2.
64. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S4.1.3.4 (1987).
65. Id. Without the extension, every new car would have had to be equipped with
some form of automatic protection for all front seat occupants by September 1989.
With the new rule, the automakers can meet the standard with automatic belts (or
airbags) for all front seat occupants, or with just airbags for the driver from 1989 until
1993, at which time full passive protection will again be mandated.
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TABLE 2
Belt Usage By State



















Nebraska 11. 29 (repealed)
Nevada 21 -
New Jersey 18 41
New Mexico 12 50
New York 16 48









Source: UNC Highway Safety Research Center, supra note 22, at 2.
faire approach tends to result in the underuse of seatbelts. Govern-
ment regulators have responded to the heavy costs imposed by such
underuse by resorting to mandatory seatbelt laws or passive re-
straint regulations. Indeed, economists Robert Cooter and Thomas
Ulen would seem to endorse this approach:
The public policy response to the presence of some risks that cannot
be accurately estimated cannot simply be to provide more information




model. Instead, public policy must in these instances be directed at
identifying the optimal level of precaution and directly requiring deci-
sion makers to take it.
6 6
But while the requirements of mandatory seatbelt laws or passive
restraint regulation may be welfare-enhancing vis-a-vis the laissez
faire situation, they are not optimal since they coerce consumers to
use seatbelts even when the full benefits of wearing belts are out-
weighed by the costs.
67
Thus, under a mandatory seatbelt law an individual willing to pay
$200 to avoid wearing a seatbelt is under the same legal compulsion
as someone who would only pay $20. If the expected benefits from
decreased accident losses are valued at, for example, $85, then soci-
ety will benefit if only the second individual wears a belt. Conceiva-
bly, this result could be reached by establishing the level of
enforcement of a mandatory law at precisely the level that makes the
expected fine equal to $85.68 But this is not the most effective
method of simplifying the cost-benefit calculus for the auto occu-
pant, since the evaluation of the probability of apprehension will be
at least as difficult as the evaluation of the probability of getting into
an accident.n
The mandatory passive restraint standards impose similar bur-
dens on consumers. Those who already use lap and shoulder belts
66. R. Cooter & T. Ulen, Law and Economics 416 (1988).
67. Under laissez faire we almost certainly have significant underuse of seatbelts,
while under mandatory laws some individuals will use seatbelts even though the social
benefits of doing so are outweighed by the costs. To the extent that the class of individ-
uals who tend to ignore mandatory seatbelt laws is primarily composed of those for
whom it would be inefficient to use belts, then the inefficiencies of the mandatory law are
mitigated. At the same time, the existence of the mandatory law will impose enforce-
ment costs that are absent in the laissez faire case.
68. For example, if the average annual benefit of belt use is $85, the amount of the
fine could be set at $85 times the reciprocal of the annual probability of apprehension.
Thus, if the level of enforcement is such that a non-complying individual will on average
have an annual probability of being caught of 25%, then the fine should be set at $340.
69. The approach of using a mandatory scheme with the expectation that individuals
will disobey the law if their compliance costs exceed the expected fine presents other
problems. First, this scheme imposes risk burdens on presumably risk-averse individu-
als. Those who comply with the law can avoid the risk of incurring the fine, but since
this scheme is predicated upon encouraging the efficient level of noncompliance it nec-
essarily must impose risk upon the noncompliers-unless a private insurance market can
insure noncompliers against the risk of apprehension and fine. Since risk costs are true
social costs, this scheme may be a more costly mechanism for obtaining optimal seatbelt
use than an ex ante payment scheme. Second, the mandatory scheme with optimal non-
compliance might be viewed as undermining the authority of the law-which in general
may not be advisable. Not only will some individuals feel apprehension about violating
the law-which again imposes a cost with no corresponding benefit-but others will be
encouraged in the belief that laws are to be obeyed only when their personal
cost/benefit assessment tips in favor of compliance. In general, it will be socially costly
if this attitude becomes widespread, because it is efficient that most laws be obeyed.
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may be particularly disadvantaged. If the car they purchase is
equipped with airbags, they will have to pay for a safety item that
may not generate a comparable level of enhanced safety.70 If the car
is not equipped with airbags, it must have automatic belts, which to
some are less desirable than manual belts. 7' Therefore, the stan-
dard may impose excessive burdens on the roughly 15% who would
normally use seatbelts, as well as upon those who object to passive
belts.
In any event, the development of occupant restraint regulation
reflects the thinking of regulators that, because increased use of
seatbelts will save lives and prevent injuries, governmental action is
sufficiently justified. Indeed, the language of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 seems to reflect this view.
7 2
But the generation of such benefits is a necessary but not sufficient
basis for governmental regulation. For example, a ban on driving
by those under age 25-or indeed a ban on all driving-would cer-
tainly reduce deaths and injuries on the highways; this does not
mean, nor would many seriously argue, that the benefits from such
prohibitions would exceed the costs they would impose.
III. Toward a Cost-Benefit Analysis of Seatbelt Use
The above discussion has demonstrated that neither laissez faire
nor coercive government regulation will generate the socially opti-
mal level of seatbelt use. To assess whether an intermediate market-
oriented governmental policy could more constructively promote
the use of occupant restraints and at the same time enhance eco-
nomic efficiency, I examine in detail the benefits and costs of
seatbelt use. This evaluation will provide the framework for the dis-
cussion of the proposed market-based scheme.
70. Arnould and Grabowski present cost/benefit calculations for airbags, and they
conclude that the benefits outweigh the costs of airbags only under certain assumptions.
Arnould & Grabowski, supra note 16, at 42-43.
71. Some automatic belts, such as those found in Volkswagen, only have a shoulder
harness without the lap component. In general, automatic belts are less effective than
the three-point lap and shoulder belts. Furthermore, automatic belts can be more cum-
bersome than manual belts. See id. at 37.
72. The Act states that "Congress hereby declares that the purpose of this chapter is
to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic acci-
dents." 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982). This declaration seems to suggest that any regulation





A. Computing the Benefits of Seatbelt Use
Conceptually, the benefits from increased seatbelt use are defined
by the expected reduction in total social costs resulting from the
wearing of seatbelts. Total social costs are the costs to the car occu-
pant (whether reimbursed by third parties or otherwise) from acci-
dents in which seatbelts are not used. These costs conceptually
represent, in the case of death, the loss of human life; and in the
case of non-fatal injuries, medical and hospitalization expenses, lost
earnings, the costs of processing insurance claims, and pain and suf-
fering. These cost estimates can be derived either from a "willing-
ness to pay" approach developed by Thaler and Rosen 73 or from a
direct estimate used by the NHTSA.
The "willingness to pay" approach estimates the benefits of
seatbelts as the expected damage reduction resulting from their use.
Thus, if every car crash caused exactly $1,000 in damage to an un-
belted auto occupant and seatbelts were 30% effective in reducing
personal injury, then the benefit of wearing a seatbelt for an occu-
pant who suffered a crash would be 30% of $ 1,000, or $300. More-
over, if the probability of being in such an accident in a given year
were, say, 10%, then the annual expected benefits of seatbelt use
would be 10% of $300, or $30. Since crashes of different severities
occur, we must compute the damage reduction afforded by seatbelt
use and the probability of being in such an accident for six different
severity categories using the following formula:
73. To circumvent the difficult problem of quantifying the value of a human life,
Thaler and Rosen have presented evidence from the labor market to determine the
amount a person would be willing to pay to reduce the probability of his own death by a
small amount. Thaler and Rosen used the fact that two otherwise identical jobs will have
different rates of pay if one of them carries a slightly higher risk of death. Thus, if the
risk of death on job A is 2/10,000 and the risk of death on job B is 1/10,000, workers
might demand an additional yearly wage of $100 to work on the more dangerous job A.
The valuation of life implicit in this demand is $100 * 10,000 = $1 million. Thaler &
Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market, in Household
Production and Consumption Studies 265 (N. Terleckyj ed. 1975). They also estimate
the life-saving value of seatbelts, inflated to 1988 dollars, to be $50.80, which does not
include the value of seatbelts in reducing the severity of nonfatal injuries. Arnould and
Grabowski have then applied the Thaler and Rosen findings to the estimated reduction
in probability of being killed or injured afforded by seatbelts to measure the benefits of
seatbelts in terms of the willingness to pay for such safety improvements. Arnould &
Grabowski, supra note 16, 30-33.
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TB = 1 D.* E.* P.,1-n
where TB = total benefits of seatbelt use, calculated as the
expected reduction in injury costs from all
accidents;
D =  estimated value of human life or injury cost for
injury severity category n;
E, = effectiveness of seatbelts in reducing injuries for
injury severity category n;
Pn = probability of being involved in an accident causing
damage approximated by injury severity category n.
Table 3.A sets forth the different sets of estimates for the three
variables needed to derive the value of benefits from seatbelt use
under the "willingness to pay" approach. In the first column, two
sets of estimates of the probability of incurring an injury of a given
severity are presented: one used by Arnould and Grabowski in their
1981 cost/benefit analysis of seatbelts based on NHTSA estimates
of 1975 data, and one that I developed using 1986 data.7 4 My esti-
mates of the probability of each class of injury are uniformly higher
than those presented by Arnould and Grabowski, and thus should
yield higher estimated benefits of seatbelts. The second column
shows two sets of estimates of the effectiveness of seatbelts in prevent-
ing or reducing damage: one furnished by the NHTSA, and the
other used by Arnould and Grabowski, which is uniformly more op-
timistic than the more recent NHTSA projections presented. In
general, I prefer the NHTSA effectiveness figures because they are
both more recent and more conservative than the Arnould and Gra-
bowski estimates. In the third column, Arnould and Grabowski
present two sets of estimates of the cost of each category of injury, and I
also present another set of estimates compiled somewhat differently
by NHTSA. The NHTSA estimates do not explicitly include pain
74. I devised the 1986 probabilities of injury in the following manner. First, I com-
puted the number of injuries in each severity class for 1986, which are presented in
Table 4 of the Appendix. Second, I estimated the annual number of total auto occu-
pants in the Appendix. See infa note 119. Finally, I divided these two numbers to obtain
the probability that any auto occupant would experience an injury of a given severity
during the course of the year. Ideally, one would like to estimate the probability of
injury of an unprotected occupant. Since the number of actual injuries occurring in
1986 is used in deriving this probability, however, the "1986" probability estimates are





A. ASSUMPTIONS USED IN CALCULATING BENEFITS OF SEATBELTS
Column I Column 2 Column 3
Probability Effectiveness
Injury of an Injury of Seatbelts 1988 $ Cost of Each Injury
Severity AG 1986 AG NHTSA AG-Low AG-High NHTSA
Minor .01 .0145 .30 .10 651 6513 2144
AIS 2 .0015 .00179 .57 .50 6513 65130 4881
AIS 3 .00025 .00065 .59 .50 32565 162825 12157
AIS 4 .00006 .00009 .60 .50 434200 434200 60456
AIS 5 .00001 .00005 .60 .50 651300 651300 283779
Fatal .00013 .00017 .60 .45 651300 651300 374965
B. ESTIMATED BENEFITS OF SEATBELTS UNDER VARYING ASSUMPTIONS
Assumptions Concerning: Estimated Benefit
Probability Effectiveness Injury Cost From Using Seatbelts Average
AG AG AG Low-High $83-$170
AG NHTSA AG Low-High $64-$130 $83-$168
1986 NHTSA AG Low-High. $103-$206,
1986 NHTSA NHTSA $50
Alternative
NHTSA approach NHTSA NHTSA $59
Note: The estimated benefits in the second to right column of B are obtained using the
"willingness to pay" methodology in all but the last row, which uses an alternative NHTSA
approach. To obtain the estimated benefits under the former approach is.the sum of the
product of the probability of injury, the effectiveness of seatbelts, and the injury cost for each of the
six injury severity categories. The "1986" estimated probabilities were computed from the
projected number of accidents of each severity in 1986. I'he NHTSA estimates of the
effectiveness of seatbelts are more recent than those used bv Arnould and Grabowski (AG),
and the NHTSA estimates of cost per injury are downward biased since they omit pain and
suffering damage.
The Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS), which grades injuries from least to most serious, is
discussed in the Appendix. See infra note 114. All monetary figures are expressed in 1988
dollars.
and suffering costs and are therefore substantially lower than the
Arnould and Grabowski estimates.
The first three rows of Table 3.B provide estimates of the benefits
of seatbelts under different combinations of these assumptions.
75
The first row replicates Arnould and Grabowski's estimates of the
yearly benefits from wearing seatbelts, which ranged from $83 to
$170, depending upon whether one employs their "high" or "low"
set of estimated costs of each injury class. The second row makes
one change to the first row estimate by using newer, lower NHTSA
75. While I rely principally on this "willingness to pay" approach in providing esti-
mates of the benefits of seatbelts, I also provide in the fourth row of Table 3.B an esti-
mate using NHTSA's injury cost figures presented in the right-hand side of column 3.
In addition, all the Table 3 estimates of the value of seatbelts are biased upwards to the
extent there is any validity to the Peltzman critique, although I assume that this effect is
quite modest empirically. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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estimates of the effectiveness of seatbelts, thereby reducing the
Arnould and Grabowski estimates to a range of $64 to $130. The
third row again makes one change from the second row estimates by
replacing Arnould and Grabowski's estimates of the probability of
different injuries with my estimated probability figures, which are
based on 1986 data and are presented in the right-hand side of col-
umn 1 of Table 3.A. The result was a range of benefits from $103 to
$206. If one averages these two revised sets of estimates in the sec-
ond and third row (which differ only in terms of the estimated
probabilities of injury) one obtains an estimate of the value of
seatbelts ranging from $83 to $168, which is remarkably close to the
Arnould and Grabowski estimates in the first row.
The wide range between the "low" and "high" estimates is
caused by the large differences in the pain and suffering costs associ-
ated with Arnould and Grabowski's three least serious injury catego-
ries. Column 3 of Table 3.A shows that their "high" estimates of
the cost of minor and moderate injuries are 10 times higher than
their low estimates. To get a sense of whether the true average ben-
efits of seatbelts are closer to the $83 figure or to the $168 figure, I
sought other information about the costs of each type of injury. Re-
cent NHTSA cost estimates were available, although they were not
devised for the "willingness to pay" methodology and are therefore
not directly comparable, since they do not include any adjustment
for pain and suffering and therefore understate the true social
costs. 76 When I substituted these NHTSA cost figures for the
Arnould and Grabowski range of figures, keeping the other two vari-
ables in the third row constant, the resulting lower-bound estimate
of the benefits of seatbelt use was $50 per year, which is presented
in the fourth row of Table 3.B.
While NHTSA did not develop these cost figures for use in a
"willingness to pay" approach to estimating the value of seatbelts,
they were designed for use in an alternative NHTSA methodology
for estimating the value of seatbelts. This method, which is em-
ployed by NHTSA in its own cost-benefit analyses, requires one to
estimate the total costs associated with deaths and injuries resulting
from motor vehicle accidents for a given year and then to assess how
much of the cost would have been avoided if everyone had worn
seatbelts. 77 In addition to the difference in methodology from the
76. These figures are presented in the last column under column 3 of Table 3.A See
text at note 78 for a discussion of the NHTSA cost figures.
77. The alternative NHTSA methodology does not employ the formula used by the




"willingness to pay" approach, the NHTSA injury cost figures, un-
like the Arnould and Grabowski estimates that specifically include
pain and suffering costs, only include readily quantifiable items such
as lost earnings, medical expenditures, and the insurance adminis-
tration cost associated with processing claims.78 While Thaler and
Rosen have argued that this direct estimate of costs does not yield
"the conceptually appropriate measure, ' ' 79 it may be useful to pres-
ent estimates of the value of seatbelts using this alternative method
since the validity of the methodology itself is not in question. Since,
once again, pain and suffering costs have not been included in the
NHTSA injury cost figures, the resulting estimate of $59, which ap-
pears in the fifth row of Table 3.B, is similarly a lower-bound
estimate.
While the matter is certainly not beyond dispute, the $50 estimate
obtained from the "willingness to pay" approach using the NHTSA
lower-bound injury cost figures and the $59 estimate obtained from
the alternative NHTSA methodology both suggest that the true av-
erage benefits of seatbelt use are probably closer to $83 than to
$168. Moreover, since an assessment of the benefits of a govern-
ment program should probably lean toward the conservative side, I
will assume for the remainder of this article that the average benefit
from wearing seatbelts is roughly $85 per year.
B. Computing the Costs of Seatbelt Use
Given that the yearly benefits from wearing seatbelts seem fairly
sizable, it is somewhat puzzling that only 15% of the public chooses
to use this safety equipment in the absence of government compul-
sion. Two possibilities may explain this phenomenon."" First, as
mentioned before, individuals undervalue the benefits of wearing
seatbelts.8 ' Second, as the following analysis shows, the costs of
wearing seatbelts exceed the benefits for certain individuals.
Table B.3 in similar format. A full discussion of the manner in which this alternative
calculation was made is presented in the Appendix.
78. See Estimation of Economic Savings, supra note 38, at 1. See also Accident Facts,
supra note 3, at 4.
79. Thaler and Rosen state that "the value of a life is the amount members of society
are willing to pay to save one." Thaler and Rosen, supra note 73, at 265. This figure can
be quite different from the present discounted value of the future lost earnings of a
deceased individual, as a comparison of the NHTSA and Arnould and Grabowski esti-
mates of the cost of a fatality in Table 3.A reveals.
80. 1 assume that there is no problem with individuals overestimating the costs of
seatbelt use.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 6-19.
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Conceivably, the decision not to wear seatbelts can be made by
rational, utility-maximizing individuals who are well-informed of the
consequences of their decision and who fully consider all relevant
costs and benefits therefrom. In this case, government action to in-
crease seatbelt use would be welfare-reducing, because the individ-
ual decisions to avoid seatbelts in the absence of government
intervention would produce socially optimal results.
Is it possible, however, that the costs of wearing seatbelts are
greater than $85? There are three types of costs associated with the
use of seatbelts: (1) the time it takes to fasten them; (2) the need to
remember to fasten a seatbelt; and (3) the discomfort associated with
wearing the belt. These costs are assessed below.8
2
1. Fastening time. Assume that the total time expended in fast-
ening and unbuckling a seatbelt is 5 seconds. Since the average in-
dividual takes 800 car trips per year, the time involved in using a
seatbelt over the year is about 4000 seconds, or 1.11 hours.813 Based
on the average hourly earnings of U.S. citizens,8 4 the value of this
lost time is about $10 per year.
8 5
2. Remembering to buckle up. Warning buzzers have been man-
dated by federal law to reduce the cost of remembering to buckle
up.8" At some point, however, the value of these buzzers is reduced
because the sound becomes part of the background noise and fails
to impinge on the consciousness of the passengers. Since it appears
that most auto passengers are either habitual wearers of seatbelts or
habitual nonwearers, this cost is probably best evaluated as the cost
of forming the habit of wearing belts. If one assumed that two
82. Note that this analysis focuses on the choice of the auto occupant to wear
seatbelts given the fact that all cars are equipped with belts by federal regulation.
Therefore, this cost/benefit analysis does not need to consider the one-time cost of in-
stalling the seatbelts. From a social perspective, however, a complete cost/benefit analy-
sis would consider these costs in order to evaluate whether the decision to install
seatbelts is cost effective.
83. The figure of 800 trips per year is from a U.S. Department of Transportation
study, cited in Arnould & Grabowski, supra note 16, at 35 n.l 1.
84. The average hourly wage of private ion-agricultural workers in December 1987
was $9.10. Economic Report of the President 298 (Table B-44) (1988).
85. This is probably an upper bound estimate of the time cost of using seatbelts for
passengers (as opposed to drivers), since the 5 seconds required to fasten a belt will
probably not be productively spent if the passenger does not bother to fasten his or her
belt and merely waits for the driver to buckle up. In other words, the opportunity cost
of a passenger in an automobile is probably less than the person's hourly wage.
86. The cost of remembering to use a precaution is something that is often over-
looked, particularly in negligence law. See Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technol-





hours of concentration would be needed to form the habit, then the
cost would be about twice the cost of fastening and unbuckling esti-
mated above, or a one-time expense of $20.87 Since this cost would
be amortized over an entire driving career of perhaps 50 years, the
annual expense might be estimated to be $.80 in the first year. 8
3. The discomfort from wearing belts. The evidence that best ap-
proximates the cost of discomfort is from a study of the use of active
and passive belts in Volkswagen Rabbits. The compliance rate of
drivers in VW Rabbits equipped with passive belts was found to be
about 78%, while a similar group of drivers of VW Rabbits
equipped with active belts had a compliance rate of only 33%70.8 In
other words, when the cost of remembering to fasten a seatbelt and
taking the time to do so were reduced to zero, seatbelt usage in-
creased dramatically. Almost half (45%) of the Rabbit drivers were
not willing to wear belts if they had to pay these two costs, but were
willing to wear seatbelts when they were eliminated.
From this evidence, Arnould and Grabowski concluded that
"[t]he striking difference in usage ... rates between VW manual and
automatic belt systems suggests that discomfort costs are not the
key reasons for the observed nonutilization of manual belt sys-
tems."!' ) While this statement seems correct at first glance, it will
not withstand closer scrutiny as soon as the dollar value of discom-
fort costs is derived below. For the 45% of the drivers who would
not wear manual belts but who did wear automatic belts, the follow-
ing two conditions hold:
(1) f + r + d > b [Don't wear manual belts], and
(2) d < b + f [Wear automatic belts],
where f = cost of buckling and unbuckling;
r = the cost of remembering to use seatbelts;
d = discomfort cost; and
b = the benefits from using seatbelts.
The first condition simply notes that the individuals found the
costs of using the manual belts to be greater than the benefits. The
second condition notes that the decision to wear the automatic belt
87. 1 readily concede the arbitrary nature of this assumption and invite readers to
substitute other plausible values.
88. If driving careers are 50 years, then the expected duration for a person chosen at
random might be 25 years. The first-year expense using straight-line depreciation
would then be 20/25 = $.80.
89. Arnould & Grabowski, supra note 16, at 35.
90. Id. at 36.
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imposes discomfort cost d, while a contrary decision requires one to
incur the unfastening costs f, 9" ' and to forego the benefits b. Since
these individuals have opted to wear the belt, it must be true that
the discomfort costs are not as great as the sum of the costs of for-
gone benefits and disengaging the automatic belt system; hence d <
b+f.
If we assume that the drivers were aware of the values off, r, and b
that were estimated above, then expressions (1) and (2) imply that:
(3) $95 > d > $74.20.
In other words, for this group, and presumably for the remaining
22% who chose not to use either the manual or the automatic belts,
the discomfort costs are the most significant of the costs associated
with wearing seatbelts.92 This evidence may provide tentative sup-
port for the view that a significant number of individuals will actually
find the total costs of using seatbelts greater than the estimated av-
erage benefit of $85 per year as the opportunity costs of fastening
and remembering begin to increase with their increase in income.
IV A New Regulatory Scheme
Although mandatory seatbelt laws and passive restraint standards
are inefficient, there may still be an important role for the govern-
ment to play in harnessing the market to promote optimal automo-
tive safety.
A. The Proposal
The proposed alternative mode of regulation seeks to align the
social and private benefits from wearing seatbelts and ensures that
individual consumer choices are socially optimal. The government
can achieve this goal by determining the "price" of not wearing a
seatbelt, which is the expected annual accident loss reduction that
seatbelts provide. Consumers are then free to purchase the right
not to wear seatbelts if they are willing to pay this price (P). Those
consumers who find that wearing seatbelts is more onerous than
paying the government-determined price will pay P and thereby be
relieved of the duty to wear a belt. Those who find that the cost of
91. Unfastening a VW automatic belt is almost the identical operation in reverse as
fastening a manual seatbelt. Therefore, I estimate these operating costs to be the same
(as represented by the variablef) in both cases.
92. It must be stressed that the conclusion that the discomfort costs are from $74.20
to $95 per year depends critically on the assumption that the perceived benefits of wearing
seatbelts are $85, and that the estimates ofcostsfand r are accurate. For example, if the
perceived benefits of wearing seatbelts were only $30, celeris paribus, then the imputed




wearing a belt is less than P will prefer to wear the belt, thereby
providing social benefits of reduced accident costs that have an ex-
pected value of P.
The precise value of P will depend not only on the expected an-
nual benefit of seatbelt use, which is taken to be $85, but also will
depend on the reason for the consumers' inaccurate assessment of
these benefits. If consumers are simply disregarding the benefits
from wearing seatbelts-because of cognitive dissonance or the mis-
taken equation of small risks with no risk-then P should be set
equal to $85 to ensure that individuals will not shun seatbelts unless
the benefits from so doing exceed $85. If, on the other hand, the
reason for the inefficient underuse of seatbelts is that the govern-
ment reimburses victims for, say, 60% of their losses, then the price
could be set at 60% of $85 = $51, which would ensure that the full
benefits-i.e., including the reduction of external costs ignored by
the individual consumer-of seatbelt usage would be evaluated
when consumers decided whether or not to wear belts.
In essence, this scheme would make the decision not to wear
seatbelts the equivalent of the decision to purchase any other mar-
ket good. If consumers wish to purchase a commodity, they are free
to do so as long as they are willing or able to pay the listed price.
When the price of the good reflects the social cost of its production,
then the consumer's willingness to pay this price implies that he or
she values the good by an amount greater than its social cost. In
other words, by forcing consumers to express their preferences in
the market, we ensure that the benefits from consumption of a good
are greater than the cost of production.
The same analysis applies with the "good" of not wearing
seatbelts. One can think of the social costs incurred from not wear-
ing seatbolts as the cost of production of this good. Therefore, soci-
ety will benefit only if those who purchase this good receive greater
benefits from its consumption than it imposes. A market-based
scheme that requires a consumer to purchase this "good" for the
full cost of its production ensures that only welfare-enhancing
purchases take place.
B. Advantages of the Scheme
The advantages of this approach are that it both eliminates coer-
cion and inefficiency inherent in a mandatory seatbelt law and
avoids the problems of divergence between private and social bene-
fits that are associated with the laissez faire approach. Under the
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proposed scheme, consumers will be less likely to undervalue the
benefits of seatbelt use for the following reasons. First, the price
feature of the market-based scheme will alleviate the problem of in-
adequate information by providing a summary estimate of the bene-
fits, packaged in an easily understandable concept of market price.93
Second, since accident probabilities will have already been incorpo-
rated in arriving at the socially optimal price, the scheme will aid
consumers in making informed risk estimates that fully reflect the
benefits of seatbelt use. 94 Third, the scheme will overcome the
moral hazard problem resulting from private and social insurance
schemes by requiring people to compensate society for the external
costs they impose on others by not wearing seatbelts.95 Finally, it
might also reduce the costs of cognitive dissonance vis-a-vis a
mandatory seatbelt law, since those who would suffer these costs
could pay the price P and never have to think about wearing a
seatbelt for the remainder of the year, or they might avoid the costs
by thinking of wearing the belts as a way to save money rather than
as a safety measure. 'I" At the same time, the market-based scheme
would presumably impose less of the psychological costs that a coer-
cive mandatory scheme would generate among those who oppose
seatbelt use: the extent of the cost would presumably be limited to
the price P, because any individual who resented the coercion by an
amount more than P would simply pay that amount and then avoid
the requirement of wearing seatbelts.
C. Certain Imperfections of the Scheme
Of course, the scheme cannot theoretically achieve the perfectly
efficient outcome. The price P is computed based on the average
individual. For those who have rock hard skulls or who drive far less
than average, P will doubtless overstate the expected annual acci-
dent losses that they will incur if they don't buckle up. Conversely,
93. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9. Consumers are relatively skilled at deter-
mining whether it is worth paying a certain price to receive a certain benefit, for indeed
this is precisely the judgment they make every day in determining whether to buy a new
pair of shoes or an air conditioner or any of thousands of other commodities. The fact
that they have to put down hard cash before they can walk off with any of these goods
assures that they will focus on the cost-benefit analysis very directly, and that the cost
component will be exactly specified and known to the consumer at the time of purchase.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19. The level of cognitive dissonance,
however, would still be greater than under a laissez faire situation, since everyone would
presumably have to consider the costs of not wearing seatbelts when initially electing




the more fragile among us, cab drivers, and young men will find that
P understates the benefit in terms of reduced annual accident ex-
pense if they were to always wear their belts. To sum up: the unreg-
ulated market is inefficient since consumers are unable to assess
accurately the private benefits of seatbelt use and they have no in-
centive to evaluate any external benefits; mandatory seatbelt laws
and passive restraint standards are inefficient in that they deprive
consumers of the ability to buy the right not to wear a belt by paying
the appropriate price; and the proposed price-based scheme of reg-
ulation may cause inefficiency to the extent that the price is inaccu-
rately set.
97
D. Administering the Market-Based Regulatory Scheme
If the market-based scheme is to be welfare-enhancing, its admin-
istrative costs must not be large relative to the net benefits it creates
from aligning the social and private cost/benefit calculations. While
an ideal market-based scheme would confront every person with an
individual choice of buckling up or paying the actual social cost of
failing to do so, this is not administratively feasible. Two possible
approaches exist. First, the system could operate by levying poten-
tial charges on each vehicle registration. If the registrant agrees al-
ways to wear a seatbelt when driving in the car, then he or she can
avoid the charge. If the registrant wishes to avoid wearing seatbelts,
he or she must pay the fee. 18 The state could then issue different
colored license plates to the two groups of car owners, or use some
97. Note that, even if the government sets the correct price P on average, the degree
of inefficiency will then depend upon the variance within the population of consumers.
Thus, if A drives a great deal and B drives very little, A may be willing to pay $200 to
avoid the burden of wearing a belt, but B may not be willing to make this payment. The
result would be that the frequent driver does not wear a belt, while the infrequent driver
does. If expected accident losses vary directly with mileage, then this result is inefficient.
While the government would ideally like to set the price of not wearing a seatbelt on a
per mile basis, this is not a realistic option in practice owing to the difficulty of monitor-
ing miles driven.
98. Presumably, all occupants of a car that has been registered so as to be exempt
from the seatbelt requirement would be free to shun seatbelts, and those in non-exempt
cars would be required to wear belts. This means that, in setting the price P, the state
should consider the expected benefits that seatbelt use would provide to all the occu-
pants of the car, not just the driver. Moreover, if some cars are demonstrably safer than
average, the state could provide lower values of P to owners of such cars.
An example that is reflective of the problems that exist when the election to be subject
to the seatbelt requirement is made on a per vehicle rather than on an individual basis
will be helpful. If the state determines that on average there are two occupants in each
car, then it will set the price at 2 * $85 = $170. Consider the case in which the driver
would suffer costs of $100 by wearing seatbelts, but the passenger would only suffer
costs of $50. The efficient solution would clearly be to have the passenger buckle up
and to allow the driver to shun seatbelts. The likely result, however, is that they will
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other mechanism to readily identify which vehicles were subject to
the seatbelt requirement1
The enforcement problems of this market-based scheme would be
roughly equivalent to those found under "primary enforcement" of
the mandatory seatbelt usage law. I° ° In one respect, enforcement
of the market scheme is more difficult in that the police would have
to observe the license plate of a car before they would know whether
its occupants were required to wear belts. On the other hand, en-
forcement would be made easier since the police would only have to
monitor those automobiles registered to individuals who did not
pay the added fee.' 0 ' Both of these factors are probably small in
magnitude and largely offsetting; therefore, the primary enforce-
ment costs of the regulatory scheme would probably be indistin-
guishable from the primary enforcement costs of a mandatory
seatbelt usage law.
A second approach would be to issue passes to individuals that
would indicate whether they were subject to the mandatory seatbelt
requirement or had paid the seatbelt fee and therefore were free not
to wear their belts. By tailoring the regulatory scheme to individuals
rather than to motor vehicle registrations, this second option could
address the fact that the benefits of seatbelt use vary considerably
depending on the readily observable factors of age and sex. For
example, since young males are in a disproportionately large
both wear seatbelts, because collectively it is only worth $150 to escape the seatbelt
requirement and they would have to pay $170 to do so.
99. In a program to stop car thefts in New York, owners who register their cars with
the police have bright yellow decals placed in their back windows that authorize the
police to stop the car if it is being driven between the hours of 1:00 and 5:00 in the
morning. Apparently, the program has drastically reduced thefts of cars registered in
the program (although whether it merely increases the theft rate of uncovered cars is not
clear). N.Y. Times, September 18, 1988, at 42. Another possibility might be to have the
license plate begin with a certain number if the registrant had paid the fee to avoid the
seatbelt requirement.
100. Primary enforcement occurs when police officers are encouraged to stop driv-
ers for violations of the state seatbelt laws, even if they are otherwise driving in an ac-
ceptable fashion.
101. Any such scheme will inevitably generate some difficulties. Consider the case
of two neighbors: individual A who pays the fee and therefore is free to not use his
seatbelt, and individual B who does not pay, and is therefore subject to a mandatory
seatbelt usage requirement. If A takes a ride in B's car, A might feel that he should not
have to wear a seatbelt. Enforcement considerations, however, would probably require
that anyone driving in a car that has not been registered to avoid the seatbelt require-
ment must wear seatbelts. While the proposed market-based scheme does not eliminate
all of the inefficient coercion inherent in the mandatory laws, it does reduce this coer-
cion: unlike the situation under a mandatory seatbelt law, A will still be free to avoid
wearing his seatbelt in his own car and in any other car whose owner has paid the requi-
site fee. This particular problem is eliminated by having an individual-based regulatory
scheme, such as that discussed next.
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number of accidents, the state could decide that they should face a
higher price for the right not to wear belts. These individual dis-
criminations would probably not be feasible if the scheme were
based on registration, however, since young males could have their
cars registered in another's name if they wished to lessen their
seatbelt fee.
While the individualized scheme would yield more precise pricing
of the right not to wear seatbelts, it would pose greater enforcement
problems than the scheme based on registration since a police of-
ficer would not know whether an individual who was not wearing a
seatbelt was under a legal duty to do so until he or she inspected the
individual's license or authorization card. Still, many states choose
to enforce their mandatory seatbelt laws only if they stop a car on
some independent ground. 0 2 For states using such "secondary en-
forcement," the individualized market-based scheme would seem to
generate no additional costs.
Note that an alternative method of achieving the same goal of en-
couraging the optimal rate of seatbelt usage would be to pay auto
occupants to wear their belts. Because of the Coasean nature of the
problem (assuming transaction costs are low), society can reach the
efficient level of seatbelt usage regardless of whether the govern-




is sensible, though, to grant the entitlement to the government as
this regulatory scheme envisions, since the opportunities for abuse
102. The District of Columbia and the following states rely purely on secondary en-
forcement of their mandatory seatbelt usage laws: California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ten-
nessee, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. National Safety Council, Mandatory Seatbelt
Use Laws by State in the U.S. 1-4 (1987).
103. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960). Under the pro-
posed market-based scheme in which the state owns the entitlement, individuals can
purchase the right not to wear seatbelts as long as they pay a pre-determined price. In
other words, the proposed scheme protects the government's entitlement with a liability
rule. The advantage of a liability rule is that generally the transaction costs are lower
than with property rules; the disadvantage is that, since the price is determined with
respect to the average individual, it will not reflect idiosyncratic traits that determine the
expected costs and benefits of seatbelt use. If auto occupants possessed the entitlement
not to wear seatbelts, however, and could be deprived of this right only with their agree-
ment at an agreed-upon price-i.e., if their entitlement was protected by a property
right-the problem of the inaccurately set price disappears but the transaction costs
would be prohibitively high. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). Note that,
while both a mandatory seatbelt law and the proposed regulatory scheme would con-
front individuals with a requirement to wear seatbelts, the proposed regime enables in-
dividuals to purchase the entitlement not to wear seatbelts ex ante. To the extent that the
mandatory law is enforced by fines, the government's entitlement appears to be pro-
tected by a liability rule; if the mandatory law is enforced by license revocation, it is a
rule of inalienability.
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appear to be greater if the government is providing cash payments
to individuals to encourage them not to drive without wearing their
seatbelts. 104
E. Possible Responses to the Market-Based Scheme
It is important to consider how consumers would likely respond
to this regulatory scheme. In general, one might expect that con-
sumers would prefer it to a mandatory seatbelt law, because it, in
effect, gives every consumer the choice of whether he or she wants
to be subject to a mandatory seatbelt law. Those who do not want
to pay to avoid this burden are in the same position as they would be
with the current mandatory laws. Moreover, those who do wish to
pay to avoid having to fasten their belts would thus escape an oner-
ous burden while voluntarily paying the costs that their behavior im-
poses on society. Since the first group is no worse off, and the
second group is better off, the substitution of a market scheme for a
mandatory usage law would constitute a Pareto improvement.
What would happen to usage rates under a market scheme? Some
of the states that have shunned the mandatory laws as undue abridg-
ments of freedom might be willing to adopt the market-based regu-
latory scheme. If so, their seatbelt usage rates would undoubtedly
rise. Would usage rates fall if a state with a mandatory law shifted to
the price-based scheme? My estimate is that no more than 10-15%
of the registrants under this regulation would choose to pay the
price and thus be able to avoid the seatbelt requirement.1 5 This
would leave the remaining 85-90% subject to a mandatory seatbelt
104. First, if government owns the entitlement, those who don't use seatbelts will
have to show that they paid the seatbelt fee; if individuals own the entitlement, non-
users will have to show that they never received a government check. It would seem that
the former can be more readily established than the latter. Second, the opportunity to
receive cash payments from the government will invite some abuse. Some individuals
will apply under multiple names to secure multiple payments intended to persuade them
to use seatbelts. In addition, some individuals who never plan to be auto passengers will
request payment from the government to encourage their use of seatbelts. No social
purpose is achieved by such wealth transfers. In general, I suspect the amount of money
that would change hands would be lower, which is more desirable, under a scheme in
which non-users had to pay a fee to the government to avoid the seatbelt requirement,
than under one in which seatbelt users received payments from the government.
105. This number might be higher if (1) the number of airbags installed in cars were
to increase in the years ahead, which seems likely; and (2) the regulators granted cars
with airbags an exemption from the seatbelt requirement. Such an exemption could be
readily achieved under the market-based scheme by simply treating owners of cars
equipped with airbags as having paid the price established by the state. However, regu-
lators may not wish to grant such an exemption if airbags are not a good substitute for
seatbelts. In fact, airbags only work in frontal crashes, and their advocates always stress




requirement. It is conceivable that usage rates among this group
would even rise above the levels seen in states with mandatory
seatbelt laws because (1) the states would have a greater monetary
incentive to enforce the law to collect the fees from those who
promised to wear their belts but then reneged; I063 (2) the additional
information on the benefits of seatbelt usage might encourage some
additional voluntary compliance; and (3) some members of the pub-
lic might feel a sense of obligation to uphold their promise to wear
belts. 107
If the numbers of registrants who find wearing belts to be burden-
some, and who therefore decide to pay the fee, is substantially
higher than I have speculated, however, seatbelt use could decline.
While I think this result is unlikely, it is acceptable since those who
pay the fee have already compensated society for the expected acci-
dent costs that they will impose, and their choice demonstrates that
the private burden of wearing seatbelts is greater than the expected
social benefits.
V. Conclusion
Owing to a variety of factors, for the last twenty years there have
been considerable improvements in highway safety.""' The death
rate per 100 million motor vehicle miles has steadily declined from
over 5 in 1966 to the current level of 2.57 in both 1985 and 1986. '
Moreover, while the other major industrial nations have similarly
experienced declines in their traffic fatality rate, the 2.57 U.S. rate
compares favorably with the 1984 death" rates in France (6.4), Italy
106. If 12.5% of the 158.6 million licensed drivers were to pay a fee of $85 to avoid
the seatbelt requirement, the revenues generated would be $1.69 billion. Many state
governments would be quite enthusiastic about tapping their share of this revenue. The
anticipated greater enforcement efforts under the market-based scheme would generate
additional costs for the state, however, and would breed some resentment from the pub-
lic.
Note that those who failed to pay the fee and refuse to wear seatbelts would have to be
sanctioned by prohibitive measures such as an exorbitant fine or license revocation;
otherwise, they would have no incentive to comply until they were apprehended.
107. These effects might spur greater consumer interest in choosing passive belt
systems to take advantage of the reduced cost of belt usage discussed above.
108. In addition to the effects of automobile safety equipment, death rates per vehi-
cle mile driven will be influenced by the age composition of the driving public, improve-
ments in automobiles and highways, the size of automobiles, consumption of alcohol
and drugs, etc.
109. Accident Facts, supra note 3, at 45.
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(5.0), Germany (4.9),Japan (4.7), and England (3.4).' 1o Further im-
provements in this safety record can be obtained most efficiently if
governments can harness market incentives to encourage seatbelt
use by those for whom the expected benefits exceed the expected
costs. The proposed market-based regulatory scheme informs con-
sumers of the expected benefits of wearing seatbelts as reflected in
the pricing and enables consumers more easily to assess whether the
costs of wearing belts exceed these benefits. A mandatory rule pre-
vents individuals from weighing the costs and benefits of their ac-
tions, while under laissez faire there is a substantial likelihood that
individuals will underassess the benefits from seatbelt use. The
market-based scheme fixes the benefit level to make the cost-benefit
comparison easier and more rational.'' As a result, more rational,
informed, and socially optimal judgments on seatbelt use will be
made, and states will generate significant revenues.
Another advantage of the market-based scheme is that it might
well serve an important didactic function. At present, most individ-
uals think in terms of dichotomous choices about various forms of
risky behavior: either the conduct should be prohibited because it is
"bad" or permitted because citizens should be "free" to do what
they want. The tremendous publicity that the law would generate,
and the price that consumers are forced to focus on, would inform
the public that risky behavior imposes costs not only on the individ-
uals who engage in it, but on society as well. It would be a valuable
lesson if individuals realized that they should be required to pay for
the harm they inflict on the public, as the price of being allowed to
engage in certain dangerous activities. However, the use of this reg-
ulatory scheme cannot easily be extended to all risky activities, nor
should it. The considerations that favor regulation are (1) the pri-
vate behavior imposes large external costs on society; (2) the varia-
tion in the social cost among different consumers is not excessively
110. Id. at 55. The large number of miles travelled on the limited access interstate
highway system in the United States undoubtedly contributes to the lower highway fatal-
ity rates based on vehicle miles in this country. In 1986, the fatality rate per 100 million
vehicles miles travelled on interstate highways was I .1. Fatal Accident Reporting Sys-
tem, supra note 3, at viii.
111. As a result, consumers have complete flexibility in evaluating the costs of
seatbelt use, but not in evaluating its benefits. Nonetheless, the market-based scheme
should not undermine the incentives that individuals currently have to fasten their
seatbelts when accident risks are increased as a result of external factors such as inclem-
ent weather and poor road conditions. McCarthy, Seat Belt Usage Rates: A Test of




large; and (3) there are simple means of enforcement of the tax., 12
A relatively small number of activities will generate social costs on
the order of $9 billion, which is the rough calculation of the social
loss resulting from the refusal to wear seatbelts (see Table 4 of the
Appendix). Less damaging activities would attract less regulatory
attention. Those who are willing to pay the full social costs imposed
by their behavior should be allowed to engage in risky behavior.' 13
This is an important lesson for rational governmental regulation
and for a responsible citizenry.
112. This lesson has many different applications for regulation. For example, the
estimated $22 billion health care cost of cigarette smoking, combined with the $43 bil-
lion cost of reductions in the labor force due to smoker's fatal illnesses, would justify a
per pack tax of $2.24 according to a 1985 study of the Congressional Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment. Passell, Who Should Pay the Cost of Smoking, N.Y. Times, June 22,
1988, at D2.
113. For those activities that are quite socially harmful, the tax scheme will not al-
ways be feasible. Thus, the regulatory plan might work for seatbelts and cigarettes, but
not for overeating. Alcohol consumption would be an intermediate case, since the at-
tendant social costs are high, but perhaps only for those who use alcohol to excess.
Tailoring a tax on excess consumption is far more difficult than simply levying a uniform
tax. See Pogue & Sgontz, Taxing to Control Social Costs: The Case of Alcohol, 79 Am.
Econ. Rev. 235 (1989). Finally, while the external costs of gun ownership are probably
quite high, and the administrative burden of a tax on guns are reasonably low, this regu-
latory plan might not be well designed for guns because of the large variance among
consumers in the degree of external damage they impose.
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Appendix
NHTSA's Alternative Methodology For Estimating
the Benefits of Seatbelts
NHTSA cost-benefit analyses are not based on the "willingness to
pay" approach, but rather upon an alternative methodology that
tries to estimate the total costs associated with deaths and injuries
from car accidents for a given year and then to determine how much
of these costs could be avoided by seatbelt use. The NHTSA figures
do not include estimates for pain and suffering costs, but include
only readily quantifiable figures, such as lost earnings, medical ex-
penditures, and the cost of processing insurance claims.
Table 4 provides estimates for the sum of such costs in 1986 (ex-
pressed in 1988 dollars). Dollar costs are assigned to each type of
injury, from least serious to fatal, and these costs are then multiplied
by the number of injuries in each category.' 14 For example, the av-
erage social cost of each of the 39,600 occupant fatalities was esti-
mated to be $374,965, or a total of $14.9 billion. Proceeding
similarly for the remaining categories of accidents generates the to-
tal cost of $30.3 billion in injuries resulting from motor vehicle
accidents. ' 1
The estimated $30.3 billion cost of accidents occurred during a
period in which seatbelt usage across the nation was roughly
34%.I "! The last column of Table 4 presents rough projections of
the total cost of injuries on the assumption that usage rates were to
rise to 100%. While the average amount of damage in each cate-
gory of accident severity would fall if everyone wore seatbelts, the
114. This analysis employs the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS), which was created by
the American Association for Automotive Medicine in 1971 to measure the degree of
injury severity. The six AIS categories are: AIS 1-minor injury, AIS 2-moderate in-
jury, AIS 3-severe injury, but not generally life-threatening, AIS 4-serious, life threat-
ening injury, AIS 5-critical injury, with likely permanent disability, and AIS 6-fatal
injury.
115. In developing the estimates in Table 4, I rely upon the following information
from the U.S. Department of Transportation. The total number of nonfatal injuries was
derived by multiplying the number of fatalities by 99. This ratio was developed from the
Department of Transportation's National Accident Sampling System, which indicated
that for the years 1982 and 1983 for the nation as a whole there were 99 police-reported
occupant injuries for every fatality. Estimation of Economic Savings, supra note 38, at 5.
The proportion of nonfatal accidents falling into each of the severity categories was then
multiplied by the total number of nonfatal injuries. The total number of accidents-
fatal plus nonfatal-was then multiplied by the average cost of such injuries for 1984,
expressed in 1988 dollars.





Costs of Automobile Accident Injuries and Deaths 1986
-At 100%
-At 34% Seatbelt Usage Rate- Usage Rate-
Injury Number $ Cost Per Total Cost Projected Cost
Level (1000s) Injury ($billions) ($billions)
AIS 1 3324.5 2,144 7.13 6.64
AIS 2 411.6 4,881 2.01 1.21
AIS 3 149.0 12,157 1.81 1.09
AIS 4 19.6 60,455 1.19 .71
AIS 5 11.8 283,779 3.34 2.01
AIS 6 39.6 374,965 14.85 9.64
Total 3960.0 30.32 21.31
Cost Reduction From Increasing Seatbelt Use to 100%: $9.01 billion Annual Savings
Per Additional Seatbelt User: $59.39
Note: All monetary figures are expressed in 1988 dollars.
damage reduction would not be uniform. Specifically, the Depart-
ment of Transportation estimates that wearing seatbelts would pre-
vent 45% of the costs in the most severe category (fatalities), 10%
of the costs in the least severe category, and 50% of all other
costs. ' 17 Using this information, I project the total injury losses that
would occur if everyone always wore seatbelts to be roughly $21.3
billion.' 8 Therefore, increasing seatbelt use from the 34% level of
1986 to 100% would have saved $9 billion. Put differently, a very
117. Estimation of Economic Savings, supra note 38, at 7. The figures supplied in
the text are the latest and the most conservative that I have found. Three other studies
have generated somewhat more optimistic assessments about the effectiveness of
seatbelts. The National Accident Sampling System surveyed approximately 3,000 acci-
dents for the years 1979 and 1980, and found that seatbelts were 64% effective in reduc-
ing injuries and 60% effective in preventing fatalities. The National Crash Severity
Study, based upon the results of 25,000 automobile accidents involved in tow-away acci-
dents, concluded that seatbelts were 50% effective in reducing injuries and 49% effec-
tive in preventing fatalities. Arnould and Grabowski used earlier NHTSA estimates,
reproduced in Table 3.A, which indicate that seatbelts reduce minor injuries by 30%
and other injuries and fatalities by 57-60%. Arnould & Grabowski, supra note 16, at 32.
118. For example, for the least serious injuries, the total costs were $7.13 billion
with a 34% seatbelt usage rate. Since belts are 10% effective in reducing accident costs
in this category, we can solve for the per accident cost x if no one were wearing seatbelts
by setting up the following algebraic equation: (.34)*(.9x) + (.66)*(x) = 2144. Once
we have the value of x, then .9x equals the cost per accident with 100% seatbelt use.
Multiplying this figure by the total number of accidents (the second column of Table 4)
yields the projected cost of $6.64 billion for the least serious injuries when everyone
wears seatbelts.
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rough estimate of the average expected annual saving in social costs
from wearing seatbelts would be around $60 per occupant. I'
119. If seatbelt use rose from 34% to 100%, then the total increase in licensed driv-
ers wearing seatbelts would be 66% of the 158.6 million drivers in 1988, or 104.7 mil-
lion. To obtain an estimate of the total number of occupants (= drivers + passengers),
I note that 69% of the fatalities in 1986 were drivers. Fatal Accident Reporting System,
supra note 3, at Table 1. Therefore, the estimated number of auto occupants is given by
158.6/.69 = 229.9, and the total increase in the number of auto occupants wearing
seatbelts (assuming the same seatbelt usage rate for both drivers and passengers) will be
66% of 229.9 million, or 151.7 million. If the total increase in auto occupants wearing
seatbelts is 151.7 million, then the savings per additional belted occupant is $9.01 bil-
lion/151. 7 million = $59.39.
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